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With the liberalisation of European Broadcasting from the 1980s and the early 
identification by new commercial channels of sporting events as key content to 
encourage viewing/subscription the relationship between sports and media 
organisations has inevitably become closer and more lucrative. However with the 
amendment of the Television Without Frontiers directive in 1997 a new element - the 
state - entered the equation, rendering it all the more complex.  
 
This paper demonstrates the extent to which in the modern era sports journalism can 
only offer a truly comprehensive account of events by adopting approaches more 
commonly associated with business and political journalism. It does so by examining 
the biggest Irish “sports” story of 2002: not the Irish teams participation in the World 
Cup but the subsequent sale of broadcast rights for that team’s home games to 
BSkyB. The narrative throws light on the increasingly complex relationship between 
sport, commercial and public service media, and the state but also details an 
extremely novel application of the Television Without Frontiers directive by the Irish 
state. 
 
* * * * 
 
On July 5 2002, three weeks after the Republic of Ireland football team had returned 
from the World Cup in Asia, the Football Association of Ireland (FAI) announced that 
they had sold BSkyB exclusive live television rights to Republic of Ireland home 
internationals for the next four years. The statement went on to note that deferred 
coverage rights had been sold to TV3, Ireland’s only privately owned1 free-to-air 
commercial broadcaster. The deal would immediately affect Ireland’s upcoming 
round of European Championship qualifying matches.  
 
The Irish public response was outrage: hitherto such matches had been available on a 
live free-to-air basis via RTÉ, the Irish public service broadcaster. Now fewer than 
one in six homes – those with access to BSkyB’s subscription services – would be 
able to see such matches. Parents without Sky subscriptions complained that their 
children would have to go to pubs to watch the game (as many Irish public houses 
draw in punters through offering the opportunity to watch Sky’s Sports Channels). 
Depending on your perspective, access to a key element of national culture had been 
sold for a mess of potage by the FAI or stolen by BSkyB. Public opprobrium was 
poured on both organisations although the FAI was particularly singled out for the 
underhand way in which it was perceived to have negotiated the deal. On the 
defensive the FAI in turn blamed RTÉ, pointing out that at a time when the 
organisation was seeking to develop the game in Ireland, the €7.5m offered by BSkyB 
far exceeded the €1.6m offered by the state broadcaster (O’Sullivan, 2002). Indeed 
the FAI pointed out that RTÉ’s offer was lower than the amount the public service 
broadcaster had paid for the previous four years’ matches. RTÉ in turn defended their 
position by arguing that the value of sports rights was falling internationally pointing 
                                                 
1 TV3 is jointly owned by CanWestGlobal (45%) and GranadaCarlton (45%). 
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to the then recent collapse of OnDigital deal with the Nationwide League in the UK 
which had seen a deal originally worth £UK315m replaced with an offer from BSkyB 
of £UK90m. Meanwhile several government ministers including the Minster for 
Communications, the Minister for Sport and ultimately the Irish premier, all 
expressed their disappointment at the deal but glumly averred that the state had no 
means of intervening in the situation.  
 
In passing each of the politicians acknowledged that 1997 amendments to the 
European Union’s "Television Without Frontiers” directive empowered EU member 
states to draw up a list of events which had to be made available on a free-to-air basis. 
Furthermore they acknowledged that these powers - granted under section 3a of the 
directive - had been transposed into Irish law three years earlier via the Broadcasting 
(Major Events Television Coverage) Act 1999. Nonetheless they stressed that despite 
strenuous negotiations with a range of sporting bodies representing soccer, rugby and 
gaelic games over the previous three years they had been unable to come up with a list 
satisfactory to all the parties concerned. 
 
And that apparently was that – the Football Association of Ireland clearly anticipated 
that, having announced the deal on late on a Friday afternoon, it would have blown 
over by end of the weekend. That it didn’t reflected two things: firstly the fact games 
involving the national team were widely regarded as events binding the country 
together. As one commentator put it: 
 
The Irish home internationals, while not as popular as World Cup games, are 
still the kind of events that draw whole families and communities around their 
television sets. In the atomised media age in which we live, there are not many 
events like that any longer (Oliver, 2002). 
 
But secondly, the story lent itself to coverage from a range of perspectives reflecting 
the different constituencies represented by the various institutions involved in the 
story. These institutions were the FAI, RTÉ, BSkyB and the Irish State. To 
understand why the story “grew legs” but also the complexity involved in properly 
covering it, we need to briefly outline each institution’s role and perspective on the 
story and the role played by the Television Without Frontiers Directive in domestic 
broadcasting regulation. 
 
Television Without Frontiers 
 
The main intention of the original 1989 version of the TWF directive was to facilitate 
the creation of a single European market in audiovisual trade. The preamble to the 
directive stressed that: 
 
…it is essential for Member States to ensure the prevention of any acts 
which may prove detrimental to freedom of movement and trade in 
television programmes. (European Council, 1989) 
 
In the original 1989 version of the directive the third article forms two short 
paragraphs which qualify stipulations laid down in the directive other articles. Clearly 
reflecting the principle of subsidiarity, it permits individual member states to “lay 
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down more detailed or stricter rules” than those embodied in the directive (European 
Council, 1989). 
 
As amended in 1997, however, Article 3 becomes much more substantial. It also 
creates an exception to the directive’s attempt to do away with barriers to trade in 
audiovisual products. The amended Article 3a states that:  
 
Each Member State may take measures in accordance with Community law to 
ensure that broadcasters under its jurisdiction do not broadcast on an exclusive 
basis events which are regarded by that Member State as being of major 
importance for society in such a way as to deprive a substantial proportion of 
the public in that Member State of the possibility of following such events via 
live coverage or deferred coverage on free television. (European Council, 
1997) 
 
In effect the article permits member states to insist that specific cultural or sporting 
events be broadcast to their citizens on a free-to-air basis. Furthermore it enjoined 
other Member States to ensure that broadcasters in their jurisdiction did not exercise 
exclusive rights so as to deprive the public in another Member State of the possibility 
of watching events designated by that other Member State on a free-to-air basis.  
 
In passing it’s worth noting that the directive thus embodies the European Union’s 
occasionally schizophrenic attitude towards the audiovisual industry (albeit one 
justified by the dual nature of the industry). Whereas the main intent of the directive is 
to remove artificial obstacles to audiovisual trade within the EU, Article 3a echoes the 
line consistently adopted by the EU since the 1993 GATT negotiations: that cultural 
products cannot simply be treated as commodities.  
 
The remainder of the article outlines the mechanics of how such events could be 
protected. Member States were to notify the Commission of any list of events drawn 
up. In turn the Commission was obliged to seek the opinion of another innovation 
introduced by the 1997 amendment – a Contact Committee constituted by “competent 
authorities of the Member States” – as to the appropriateness of the list. Finally the 
Commission was given three months in which to inform the relevant Member State as 
to whether the list was acceptable or not. As of 2002 five countries had submitted lists 
to the Commission: Germany, Italy, the UK, Austria and Denmark and a further three 
(the Netherlands, Belgium and France) had notified the Commission of their intention 
to adopt similar lists (Commission of the European Communities (CEC) 2003).  
 
The size and variety of lists varied from country to country: the UK listed 19 separate 
events whilst Germany listed just five. Virtually all the lists included the Olympics, 
and soccer’s World Cup/European Championships. Indeed the bulk of the events 
listed were of a sporting nature, although in Italy and Austria several musical events 
were also included.  
 
Until 2002 the application of Article 3a in individual Member States had been 
relatively straightforward. Indeed the only substantive block to the Article’s operation 
came at the behest of a Member State rather the Commission: on 1 January 2002 the 
new conservative Danish government revoked the list drawn up by their socialist 
predecessors on the grounds that they “considered that the arrangement in question 
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was not compatible with free competition on the market” (Ministry of Culture – 
Denmark, 2003). 
 
This then is the European legislative context in which the Sale of Irish television 
rights took place. What then was the role of the key players in the deal? 
 
The Football Association of Ireland 
 
Prior to 1988 the Republic of Ireland had never qualified for a major international 
championship. However after qualifying for the 1988 European Championships the 
team went on to qualify for the 1990, 1994 and 2002 World Cups. The net effect of 
this was that the FAI, an organisation run in part by volunteers or part-time staff, was 
forced to professionalise its own activities, a process not without its growing pains –
the FAI was roundly criticised for its failure to capitalise financially from the team’s 
involvement in the 1990 and 1994 World Cups. Nonetheless as the 1990s progressed 
lessons were learnt - the FAI would net in the region of €1m from the Republic of 
Ireland’s involvement in the 2002 World Cup (Dooley, 2002).  
 
This professionalism was also evident in the manner in which the FAI adapted to a 
changing international market for sports rights. In September 1994, the FAI signed a 
four year deal with RTÉ which renewed what was by then regarded as the station’s 
customary coverage of the Republic’s international home games. The value of the 
1994 deal was never published but according to a joint FAI/RTÉ statement the sum 
involved was "a significant increase on the previous sum, and substantial" (Thornley 
1994). This deal was further eclipsed by another agreement in 1996 which - at the 
time – was the biggest in the history of the RTÉ Sports Department. Nonetheless the 
sums involved in any of RTÉ’s deals with the FAI would clearly be eclipsed by the 
BSkyB deal in 2002. From a commercial perspective the FAI had apparently been 
extremely successful, given that it had secured an offer of €7.5m from BSkyB for its 
rights in comparison with the €1.2m offered by RTÉ. To have used the latter offer as a 
means of leveraging €7.5m from BSkyB seemed some achievement. 
 
The scale of the negative public response to the BSkyB deal makes it clear that the 
professionalism exhibited in negotiations had not yet extended to the FAI’s Public 
Relations operations. In contrast to the PR savvy demonstrated in the English and 
Scottish professional leagues (where many of the Republic of Ireland’s players ply 
their trade), the FAI has, at least until recently a history of scoring PR own-goals. 
Although Boyle, Dinan and Morrow (2002) note with regard to the English and 
Scottish Football leagues that the closed world of football journalism is “perhaps 
beginning to be transformed as the influence of agents and PR increases,” this 
influence was in its infancy within the FAI at the time of the sale of the rights relating 
to the Irish team.2
 
                                                 
2 For example in the 12 months leading up to June 2002 the FAI had been roundly savaged in the press 
for its involvement in an abortive (but expensive) attempt to establish a new national soccer stadium. 
Furthermore when the star player of the Republic of Ireland side was sent home from the Irish team’s 
Saipan World Cup training camp before the team’s first match following a highly public dispute with 
the manager, somehow the FAI again took the brunt of the blame. In the wake of what became known 
as “the Saipan meltdown”, the organisation had belatedly employed the services of an independent PR 
consultant. See Humphries 2003. 
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In consequence the release of the news about the television deal was not handled well. 
The timing was appalling: on June 16, 773,000 viewers had watched the team suffer a 
glorious defeat at the hands of the Spanish team and exit the World Cup in its second 
round. 100,000 people turned up in Dublin’s Phoenix Park to welcome the team home 
a few days later. These events were still fresh in the public mind when the FAI 
announced the BSkyB deal three weeks later. Furthermore the FAI’s initial 
announcement made scant effort to place a positive spin on the fact that four years 
worth of games were about to become unavailable to the majority of the population: 
rather it adopted a petulant tone, blaming the loss of the games on RTÉ’s failure to 
come up with a realistic offer.  
 
A more positive spin was offered later but only in response to a week of public 
outrage expressed through the letters pages of the national press and radio phone-in 
shows. In consequence the FAI’s more nuanced justification for the deal - which 
focused on the need to invest in schools soccer, upgrading the national coaching 
system and investing in facilities and infrastructure around the country - largely fell 
on deaf ears. In effect in the furore over the BSkyB deal the fact that the FAI had 
acted not merely like a professional organisation but also as a business was lost.  
 
Also lost in the furore, however, was the FAI’s reading of the state’s failure to 
designate the home internationals as per Article 3a of TWF (or Article 4 of the Irish 
legislation which transposed the article into domestic law) in the five years since the 
directive had been amended. Quite reasonably FAI  took this to mean that they could  
enter negotiations with organisations like BSkyB without political interference. This 




The reaction of the Irish public service broadcaster to the BSkyB deal was to seek to 
portray itself as the victim of bad faith. RTÉ asserted that the FAI had signed the 
BSkyB deal whilst still nominally negotiating with RTÉ (an assertion refuted by the 
FAI). However, reading between the lines, it appeared that the broadcaster was also 
reeling from shock: there was a sense that the station had operated under the 
assumption that such a loss simply would not happen.  
 
Such confidence is reflected in the specific terms of earlier deals between RTÉ and 
the FAI. The 1994 RTÉ/FAI deal was due to run until 1998 but only guaranteed the 
station coverage of one competitive game in either the World Cup or European 
Championship qualifying series. In practice RTÉ had covered virtually every game in 
the qualifying rounds of the respective 1994 and 1996 World and European 
championships and it appears that both RTÉ and the FAI had simply assumed that this 
would be the case. The casualness of the deal’s terms appeared to reflect RTÉ’s 
confidence that its de facto status as a television broadcasting monopoly meant that a 
deal with more specific terms was unnecessary. In some respects the relationship 
paralleled that which existed between the English FA and the BBC/ITV duopoly prior 
to the establishment of BSkyB: when the English League attempted to dictate terms 
relating to television rights at the beginning of the 1985/86 season, both the BBC and 
ITV simply ceased broadcasting live matches until the League – suitably chastened – 
returned to the negotiating table (Baimbridge, Camerson and Dawson, 1996). 
 5
Similarly in 1994 RTÉ was apparently able to dictate terms to the FAI, a fact that 
must have chafed with the latter organisation 
 
However if in 1994 RTÉ were apparently immune to the threat with regard to 
broadcast sports rights posed by corporate interests such as the Kirch group and 
BSkyB the same was not true two years later. Midway through the ‘94-’98 deal, 
motivated in part3 by speculation that BSkyB was considering bidding to secure 
exclusive broadcasting rights to all Ireland's home games, RTÉ re-entered 
negotiations with the FAI. The result was a deal – the biggest hitherto negotiated by 
RTÉ Sport - entitling RTÉ to cover all home games played by the Republic of Ireland, 
competitive or otherwise, until 2002 (Byrne, 1996). 
 
Between 1996 and 2002 however, RTÉ, like public service broadcasters across 
Europe, continued to see new commercial competitors emerge. By European 
standards RTÉ’s status as a television monopoly had been unusually longlived. 
Although legislation ending the station’s state-mandated monopoly in television 
broadcasting was passed in 1988, it wasn’t until 1998, that the first private television 
station –TV3 - took to the air. Given the clear and present danger posed by TV3 and 
BSkyB, it appears surprising that RTÉ station didn’t take the threat of competition 
within the Irish market more seriously when negotiating with the FAI in 2002.  
 
However, the station was financially ill-equipped to face such competition. In the 
1990s RTÉ not only faced more competition but also competition of a different nature 
than hitherto. In theory RTÉ had operated in a competitive environment since its 
inception in 1961 as viewers living on the east coast of Ireland already had access to 
both the BBC and ITV output. And as new channels came into being in the UK in the 
following decades they have almost automatically become available to the Irish 
audience. This tacit competition with UK channels for audiences did not extend to 
competition for advertising revenues, however: RTÉ retained a de facto monopoly in 
Irish television advertising market until the 1990s. However as competition within the 
UK market in particular heated up in the early 1990s - with the arrival of Sky and 
Channel 5 - the established UK terrestrial stations began to consider new markets. 
Hence in 1993, both UTV4 and Channel 4 began canvassing for advertising from Irish 
companies (Foley, 1993). As of early 2004, MTV, Sky One, E4 and Nickleodeon 
were also offering Irish advertisers local opt-outs during ad-breaks to allowing them 
to target ads to Irish audiences.  
 
The net effect of this on RTÉ has been dramatic. Not only has the station lost market 
share5 but it is losing advertisers. In theory this shouldn’t be an overriding concern for 
RTÉ: as a public service broadcaster the station could expect to be at least partially 
shielded from the demands of the market by the licence fee. However at the time of 
the BSkyB deal successive government refusals to countenance a licence fee increase 
meant that the Irish television licence was one of the cheapest in Europe: this had 
forced the station to look to commercial sources for funding. Thus by 2002 70% of 
                                                 
3 The renegotiation may also have reflected the first attempt by RTE’s long-time head of sport Tim 
O'Connor, to retire. O'Connor did ultimately retire in 99/2000. 
4 Holder of the ITV franchise for Northern Ireland. 
5 In 1997 RTE’s market share amongst those viewers with access to both UK and Irish stations (termed 
“multichannel viewers” in Ireland) was 45%. By February 2004, this figure had fallen to 39.1%. See 
AC Neilsen 1997 and 2004. 
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the station’s annual income came from commercial sources (Flynn, 2002a, p. 170). 
Even with this the station was still losing money – in 2001 it recorded a deficit of 
€70m (Radio Telifís Éireann Authority, 2002, p. 50). 
  
Ironically then precisely because the station was poorly financially equipped to 
engage in a rights bidding war its reliance on commercial income meant that the 
games were important not just to RTÉ’s cultural mission as a public service 
broadcaster but also because of their potential advertising revenues. The average TVR 
for Ireland’s World Cup qualifying games between September 2000 and October 
2001 had been a healthy 13.7, despite the fact that fact that several of the games took 
place during work hours against competition who wouldn’t normally drag in an 





The position of BSkyB in the Irish affair is inevitably a complex one given its place in 
the intricate cross-media empire that is News International. NI owns 36% of BSkyB. 
It also owns the Sun, the Sunday Times and the News of the World, three British 
newspapers which enjoy substantial sales in the Irish Republic.  
 
BSkyB operates on a number of levels in Irish Television. At one level it is a simply a 
television channel: 57% of Irish Television Households have access to Sky One and 
Sky News, the station’s unencrypted channels, although that figure rises to 91% in the 
Dublin region. Indeed such is their interest in the Irish Market that in Spring 2004 the 
station announced the production of a dedicated Irish news programme (Grainne 
Seoige, 2004). Meanwhile the station’s three subscription sports channels enjoy 
household penetration rates of between 15% and 19%.  
 
However BSkyB is also an important television service provider in Ireland - as of 
December 2003, 297,000 Irish homes subscribed to Sky’s digital satellite service. 
This represents a remarkable success story for the company. Having only launched 
digital television in Ireland in 1999, Sky’s subscriber base now accounts for more 
than 20% of all Irish homes and 75% of the domestic digital market (the rest being 
mainly accounted for by NTL’s digital cable service) (Commission for 
Communications Regulation, 2003. p. 17). De facto then BSkyB is the dominant 
player in the Irish digital market, especially given the collapse of a government 
strategy to introduce Digital Terrestrial Television. 
 
The company’s digital strategy is reliant on attractive local content. Rupert Murdoch’s 
identification of sport and movies as the battering ram that would gain entry for his 
channels into people’s home has been repeated to the point of banality but it remains a 
key element in the strategic plans of his television interests. Thus although one 
doesn’t need digital television to access the Sky Sports Channels, the manner in which 
Sky structures its various suites of channel offerings use the content of the Sports 
Channels to incentivise Sports Channel subscribers into installing Sky digital. The 
“ordinary” price for a Sky digital installation digital is €100 but if one opts for Sky’s 
premium package (which includes all three sports channels plus two movie channels) 
that fee is dropped to an almost negligible €15.  
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Hence BSkyB’s interest in Irish soccer. The channel had in any case already become 
somewhat unwillingly involved in funding Irish football some six years earlier. Under 
UEFA rules, in agreeing broadcast rights deals, a given country's football association 
must have the permission of other associations potentially affected by that coverage. 
Thus when the English FA sold the Premiership screening rights to BSkyB in 1992 in 
a deal which envisaged screening a hitherto unprecedented6 60 live matches each 
year, they had to discuss the impact with the FAI. Since Premiership matches were 
widely watched in Ireland, the FAI were entitled to compensation for lost crowds at 
Irish games. Such payments could not be made in the form of cash, however: thus it 
was that in the early 1990s BSkyB put £IR1.5m into upgrading facilities at Irish 
grounds. Furthermore in 1999 BSkyB had purchased rights to screen the Republic of 
Ireland’s home matches in the UK, in an attempt to appeal to the substantial Irish 
community living there. 
 
As such the €7.5m offered by BSkyB made doubly good business sense: given the 
cost in 2002 of subscribing to Sky’s Sports channels and the fact that the annual cost 
to BSkyB of the deal was €1.875m, Sky would only need an additional 3,000 - 4,000 
subscribers to offset the cost of the deal. At a point when Sky had already secured 
200,000-plus Irish subscribers, a further 3,000-4,000 seemed an entirely likely 
prospect.  
 
The government’s position 
 
Of all the actors in this narrative the rationale for action (or indeed inaction) of the 
Irish government is most opaque. It is important to stress that the same Fianna 
Fáil/Progressive Democrat coalition in power at the time of the BSkyB deal had three 
years earlier introduced the Broadcasting (Major Television Events Coverage) Bill 
which transposed Article 3a of Television Without Frontiers into Irish law. 
Introducing the act, the then Minister for Arts, Heritage, Gaeltacht and the Islands, 
Síle de Valera, stressed that her intent was “to protect the major cultural and sporting 
events from pay-per-view". She acknowledged the concerns of event organisers 
regarding the impact of the legislation on their ability to negotiate television deals but 
countered this by noting, "it must be recognised that the citizen has rights too, and 
these must be safeguarded" (Mac Carthaigh, 1999). The short (five pages long) Bill 
won broad support from all parties in the Dil and passed uncontroversially into law in 
Autumn 1999.  
 
At this point it was assumed that the next stage would be for the Minister to prepare  
list of protected events as the legislation required. Yet in the nearly three years 
between the passing of the legislation and the announcement of the FAI/BSkyB deal 
no list was drawn up. It is impossible to be say definitely why this should have been 
the case. One can reasonably disregard the possibility that the government didn’t 
consider it urgent, if only because the period 1999-2002 saw recurrent warnings of the 
consequences of not drawing up the list. In 1998, 2000 and again in February 2002, 
Irish viewers were unable to watch Ireland’s rugby matches against England in the 
Six Nations Rugby Championship. This came about as a result of a five year (1998-
2002) deal between the English Rugby Football Union and BSkyB whereby the 
                                                 
6 The previous FA/ITV deal assumed the screening of 18 live matches per season. See Baimbridge,  
Camerson and Dawson 1996. 
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former sold the latter exclusive live screening rights to home games played as part of 
the Six Nations Championship. This led one Fianna Fáil Senator to publicly criticise 
Síle de Valera’s failure to preserve the event for Irish viewers by nominating it as a 
cultural event (Thornley, 2002).  
 
If even criticism from within the government’s own party was unable to prompt some 
action it raises the question of what other interests might have been served by any 
failure to put the act into effect. Clearly these would have included the various 
sporting organisations that would potentially see their events included on a list – the 
FAI, the Irish Rugby Football Union and the Gaelic Athletic Association. Indeed the 
government would later explicitly state that the unwillingness of the organisations to 
agree to any list had been a major source of delay. However given that the 1999 
legislation’s entire rationale was based around the assumption that such organisations 
would not voluntarily commit to selling their games to free-to-air channels, it was 
never clear as to why the recalcitrance of the organisations could block the drawing 
up of a list. In any case the professed impotence of the Irish government in dealing 
with the FAI was somewhat belied by the Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) Mary 
Harney who at the time disclosed that substantial amounts of grant aid were being 
afforded to the FAI by the same government. 
 
This then points to another possible interested party - BSkyB and its owner Rupert 
Murdoch. The chilling effect of Rupert Murdoch on politicians has frequently been 
asserted (if less frequently demonstrated). In this regard, writers on political economy 
of the media frequently point to Tony Blair’s trip to Hayman Island, Australia in 1995 
to address the “massed ranks of News Corporation executives” (Curran and Seaton, 
1997, p. 300) and to meet Rupert Murdoch himself. Although the details of the private 
meeting were never disclosed, some press comment assumed that the two agreed a 
deal whereby Blair agreed to soft-pedal restrictions on cross-media ownership (if and 
when he entered government) in return for guarantees relating to the editorial line of 
News International titles in the UK with regard to New Labour (Porter, 1995). 
 
This is supported by Curran and Seaton’s (1997, p. 366) point about Murdoch’s 
ability to “weave his way past regulatory obstacles in Australia, the United States and 
Britain through a combination of political horse-trading, intimidation and charm.” 
 
However such a point is also supported by the apparently warm relationship between 
Murdoch and the current Irish administration. In June 2002, a month before the 
signing of the FAI/BSkyB deal Rupert Murdoch was in Ireland at the inauguration of 
a new News International printing plant in Kells, County Meath. He was welcomed to 
Ireland by the individual officially undertaking the opening – Fianna Fáil party Leader 
and Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern. In his opening address Ahern described 
Murdoch as "one of the world's foremost leaders in media who has been hailed as one 
of the most outstanding Australian figures of modern times" (Cullen, 2002). In an 
intriguing response given the temporal proximity of the television deal, Murdoch said 
it was hard to think of anywhere more conducive to business than the Republic 
(Smurfit, Murdoch, 2002). 
 
This meeting followed half a decades worth of support for the Fianna Fáil party (and 
Taoiseach Bertie Ahern in particular) from News International titles published in 
Ireland. Although historically Murdoch has been at pains to stress his non-interference 
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in the line taken by the editors of his newspapers, it nonetheless appears that the 
editors of the Irish editions of the Sun, the News of the World and the Sunday Times, 
share Murdoch’s high opinion of the current government. For example, one 
unpublished study on the News of the World’s political content tracked the political 
allegiance of those politicians invited to pen the paper’s comment column, located on 
its editorial page.  This study noted that of the 96 published comment pieces by Irish 
politicians between 1998 and 2000, 78 were written by Fianna Fáil TDs or Senators. 
By contrast the next largest party - Fine Gael - was invited to write just two pieces 
over the same period. The study also calls attention to an interview with Bertie Ahern, 
then opposition leader, published by the paper on 18th May 1997, one day after the 
calling of a general election. Under the heading “Ahern the Man for All Ireland” the 
front page, and two inside pages were given over to the interview which proclaimed 
that Bertie Ahern “could become a statesman to equal the legendary Eamon de 
Valera”. However what is most striking is that the interview was conducted, not by 
the paper's Irish editor, but by a senior associate editor based in London, Alex 
Murunchak. Noting that Mr. Marunchak’s by-line has not appeared in the Irish edition 
of the News of the World since the study points to similarities with the direct 
intervention by Rupert Murdoch to ensure that The Sun endorsed Tony Blair at the 
outset of the 1997 British General election campaign (Daly, 2002).  
 
Yet recent political history in Ireland has reminded politicians of how fickle press 
support can be, particularly when government policy clashes with business interests 
owned by large-scale media organisations. In this respect it is worth noting that  
Ireland has the greatest level of concentration of press ownership in the European 
Union: the newspaper market is dominated by the Independent Newspaper Group 
which owns titles accounting for 70% Irish Sunday sales, 100% of the evening daily 
market and 49% of daily sales - including the best-selling daily in the country the 
Irish Independent.7 On the eve of the 1997 election, this last paper abandoned a half-
century old pro-Fine Gael (then the leading party in a coalition government) editorial 
line, and urged voters to support Fianna Fáil. This dramatic shift was largely driven 
by the coalition’s failure to prosecute those involved in establishing local television 
distribution services in rural areas. This arguably undermined the position of Princes 
Holdings, a cable company owned by Independent Newspapers. Fine Gael might have 
lost the election regardless of the Independent’s editorial line but as Horgan (2001, p. 
171) states, the “Payback Time” editorial “marked a watershed in Irish journalism 
which few would forget”.  
 
Nor is the influence of the News International Group in Ireland in this respect to be 
underestimated. The Irish Sun is now the second best-selling daily paper in Ireland. 
Meanwhile the two News International Sunday Titles – The Sunday Times and the 
News of the World – now account for more than 20% of all “Irish” Sunday sales 
(Audit Bureau of Circulation, 2003). Furthermore lest the Irish government was in 
any doubt as to how News International would view the furore over the deal, the Irish 
editions of both Sundays on weekend following the BSkyB deal distinguished 
themselves by – in contrast to every other paper’s editorial line - arguing that the 
                                                 
7 Author’s own calculations based on Audit Bureau of Circulation 2003 data. These percentages 
assume the Irish market is limited to domestically headquartered newspapers and thereby exclude Irish 
editions of UK titles. In the case where a newspaper is only part-owned by Independent Newspapers I 
have only included sales figures equivalent to the company’s shareholdings in that title – e.g. 50% of 
the Irish Star’s sales which Independent Newspapers co-own with the Express Group in the UK. 
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BSkyB deal was a good thing for soccer in Ireland. A writer in The Sunday Times’ 
Irish edition noted that "the FAI deserves credit for another respectable leap towards 
financial viability" (O’Brien, 2002). 
 
The Half-Time discussion 
 
The extended public debate which followed the deal quickly resolved around a 
number of assumptions which were presented as common-sense. In crude terms these 
were that: 
 
 The FAI were greedy 
 RTÉ were cheap 
 BSkyB were also greedy and culturally insensitive 
 The government was inept 
 
None of these things were straightforwardly true but they were understandable given 
that one had a story that could arguably only be completely told through combining 
the perspectives of a business correspondent, a political commentator, a sports editor 
and a media journalist.  
 
The last fifteen years has clearly witnessed a transformation in financial context in 
which sports organisations operate - most overtly in BSkyB's acquisition of the rights 
to the English Premier League.8 In this regard Boyle et al (2002) make the point that 
many sports journalists are ill-equipped to report on the business of sport, lacking as 
they do basic knowledge of financial matters. This is reflected in the Irish context - 
criticisms of RTÉ’s poor offer did not recognise that in economic terms subscription 
and free-to-air broadcasters were not operating in the same markets and that sporting 
rights were – by definition – worth more in a subscription market. Equally the 
question of whether the FAI was de facto a monopoly and could not expect to escape 
some regulation of its activities was not extensively discussed.  
 
Indeed there was obviously also some confusion as to whether the story should be 
treated in business terms at all. Boyle et al have noted an increasing interest in the 
business of football across the media spectrum citing for example, The Financial 
Times' weekly sports page written by financial journalists. However, while there is a 
clear logic for doing this with regard to clubs like Manchester United, clubs which are 
also literally PLCs turning over £UK100m-plus turnovers (Manchester United, 2004), 
it's harder to determine how national sporting organisations which did not owe an 
allegiance to shareholders on the stock market- i.e. the FAI - should be treated. 
 
Yet if Boyle et al conclude that many sports journalists are unable to adequately cover 
the business side of sports, the Irish case study suggests that the degree of subject 
specialisation which now characterises all journalistic work leaves many ill-equipped 
to deal with stories which revolve around politics, markets and sports. In particular 
the Irish case study points to the difficulties thrown up by a sports story so heavily 
effected by influence of domestic politics and European legislation on regulating 
cultural affairs.  
                                                 
8 In 1988 ITV paid the English Football League £11m for four years of television rights. When the 
rights were next negotiated in 1992, BSkyB bid - a then staggering - £191.5m for the same period of 
time. This rose again to £UK670m in 1997. See Cave and Crandall 2001. 
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This is evident from any examination of the government's response to the deal. Driven 
by a private recognition that it bore some measure of the culpability for the deal the 
state sought to distance itself from the entire affair. A series of announcements from a 
variety of government ministers sought to ensure that the news agenda portrayed the 
matter as purely in the hands of the FAI, BSkyB and RTÉ. Thus a day after the deal 
was announced Minister for Communications, Dermot Ahern, described it as a 
“devastating blow” adding that it had come as a “bolt from the blue” (McNally, 
2002). Two days later again, the Minister for Arts and Sports, John O’Donoghue 
made it clear that the deal was a private one that that the government could not 
intervene in, describing the agreement as “done and dusted” (O’Sullivan, 2002). 
Having established this distance both the aforementioned Ministers and latterly the 
Taoiseach (who described the deal as “disenfranchising” Irish fans (Flynn, 2002c)) 
were in a position to express, variously, outrage and disappointment at the deal.  
 
Over the first weekend of the story this media management was partly successful: the 
line adopted by most journalists was that the FAI had hoodwinked RTÉ and Irish 
fans. As Monday dawned, however, criticism began to emerge of the government’s 
lengthy failure to prevent the deal by listing the home internationals under the 1999 
Broadcasting (Major Television Events Coverage) Act. Strikingly the initial reference 
to the 1999 Act did not come from a journalist: indeed it seems that no Irish print or 
broadcast journalist was aware of either the Irish legislation or the European directive 
it was based on. Instead the Act was pointed to more or less simultaneously by an 
opposition politician and the author of the current piece. 
 
However with the legislation and the state’s failure to use it on the agenda, the 
government were forced to respond. They did so in a politically novel fashion: they 
criticised their own legislation with a series of assertions about its limitations. These 
were:  
 
• That the legislation was “legally risky”. 
• That it was impossible to designate entire tournaments under the legislation. 
• That the consent of sporting or cultural rights holders such as the FAI was 
required before “their” events could be listed. 
• That lists drawn up in other European countries had been rowed back on.  
• That to list events under the legislation would effectively force sporting 
organisations to sell their television rights to RTÉ, thus undermining their 
bargaining position when striking deals on those rights. 
 
However these assertions proved to be either incorrect or simply irrelevant. Points 
two and three were entirely inaccurate, and were apparently made without any 
reference to the relevant legislation. The point about the inability to designate entire 
tournaments stood out in this regard. There was nothing in either the Irish legislation, 
EU directives or actual practice in other countries which could be remotely construed 
in such a manner. The first assertion describing the legislation as legally risky was 
clearly a red herring - no legislative proposition is ever entirely without such 
ambiguity. Meanwhile the final assertion - although true - missed the core (indeed 
almost only) intent of that Broadcasting Act as explicitly stated by the minister who 
introduced the legislation in 1999: to ensure that the financial interests of cultural 
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organisations were not placed above the rights of citizens to participate in cultural 
events. 
 
However, once again most journalists simply accepted these assertions regarding both 
the Irish and EU legislation as fact. There is a substantial literature on the extent to 
which journalists rely (and given deadline pressures arguably must rely) on official 
sources. However the Irish case study suggests that the state actively exploits this fact 
making misleading assertions on the assumption that no journalist will have the time 
to check them out, particularly if the story is one which involves dealing with several 
specialisms simultaneously.  
 
However, this reliance on authoritative sources can work in more than one way. Six 
days into the story the current author wrote an opinion piece for The Irish Times 
which tentatively suggested that although the government had apparently missed the 
boat in terms of listing the Irish games that there was nothing in the domestic 
legislation specifically prohibiting the designation of games already subject to a deal 
between and a sporting organisation and a subscription broadcaster (Flynn, 2002b). 
Two days late the Irish Times and RTÉ carried interviews with a senior European 
Commission official attached to Vivianne Redin's  Education and Culture Directorate. 
The official, Christophe Forax, asserted that a list once published applied "to all 
events listed - even contracts signed beforehand" (Hennessy, 2002). 
 
In passing one should note that, given the prior existence of the FAI/BSkyB deal, such 
designation would indeed have been “legally risky”. Although Article 3a of TWF 
allows governments to draw up lists it notes that they should do so “in a clear and 
transparent manner in due and effective time” (italics added). Such retrospective 
designation also appeared to clash with the Irish constitution’s stout defence of 
property rights. However the straightforward acceptance of Christophe Forax's 
comments by the Irish media pointed to another failure to actually read the European 
legislation. As a consequence, however, the government suddenly found it politically 
necessary to reconsider their position. Faced with an issue that wasn't going away the 
government apparently decided that their best bet was to adopt the role of the white 
knight belatedly rescuing Irish fans. Hence on July 13, days after his Minister for 
Sports’ “done and dusted” comment, the Taoiseach presented the government’s new 
line: 
 
We are the sovereign government and there is legislation and an EU directive 
and it is quite clear. We cannot sit around and disenfranchise a large part of 
the population from seeing matches they are allowed to see. (Flynn, 2002c) 
 
Yet the manner in which the government actually sought to turn the deal around 
suggests that the state was well aware of the very real legal risk in attempting to 




The government followed the announcement of their determination to wrest back the 
games for Irish citizens by calling a series of private meetings with the country’s 
major sporting organisations informing them of their intent to designate some of their 
games. Veiled references were made to the Attorney-General’s view that the state had 
 13
some “legal options” regarding the deal. Predictably the organisations objected to any 
suggestion that deals might be undone by lists that had not been in existence at the 
time of the original deals were signed. However what made these meetings with the 
sporting organisations unusual is that both Article 3a of Television Without Frontiers 
and the 1999 Irish legislation refer to the power of member states/governments to 
dictate to broadcasting organisations with regard to designated events: 
 
Each Member State may take measures in accordance with Community law to 
ensure that broadcasters under its jurisdiction do not broadcast on an 
exclusive basis events which are regarded by that Member State as being of 
major importance for society… (European Council, 1989) 
 
4.-(1) Where a broadcaster under the jurisdiction of the state who is not a 
qualifying broadcaster acquires rights to broadcast a designated event, that 
broadcaster shall not broadcast the event unless the event has been made 
available to a qualifying [i.e. free-to-air]…(Government of Ireland, 1999) 
 
If there was no reference to event organisers in this or any other article in the 1999 
Irish legislation, what then was the point of these meetings? 
 
The question was only finally resolved by the second major innovation introduced by 
the Irish state with regard to the workings of TWF – (the first being the notion that it 
permitted retrospective going forward designation of events). In October 2002, after 
months of consultation, the Irish government published a list of designated events 
which included Republic's home and away soccer European Championships and 
World Cup qualifying matches, the All-Ireland hurling and football finals, the Irish 
Derby and the Irish Grand National. However they also announced that they would 
need to amend the 1999 legislation to ensure that the games covered by the 
FAI/BSkyB deal would be made available on a free-to-air basis. 
 
That amendment appeared in April 2003 via the Broadcasting (Major Events 
Television Coverage) (Amendment) Act. The second article of the new legislation 
covered the question of retrospection:  
 
This Act applies to a designated event which is designated before or after the 
passing of this Act...whether or not any agreement or arrangement has been 
entered into between the event organiser and a broadcaster in respect of the 
acquisition by the broadcaster of the rights to the event. (Italics added) 
(Government of Ireland, 2003) 
 
However the most significant change came with article 4 which now read: 
 
Where an event has been designated…and if…the event organiser has not 
made an agreement or arrangement with a qualifying broadcaster to enable it 
to provide coverage on free television services with the state…a qualifying 
broadcaster may apply to the High Court…for an order directing the event 
organiser to give rights to the qualifying broadcaster to provide such 
coverage. (Italics added) (Government of Ireland, 2003) 
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In short the amendment shifted the focus of the exercise of the state’s authority from 
the broadcasting organisations to the events organisers. In effect whilst the 1999 
legislation would have brought the state into direct confrontation with BSkyB, the 
amendment set up a showdown with the Football Association of Ireland. In so doing 
the 2003 Amendment appears to exceed the authority granted to member states by 
Article 3a which doesn’t appear to extend beyond authority over broadcasters. 
 
The significance of this shift was entirely missed by the Irish media – not one report 
noted the changes in focus between the 1999 and 2003 legislation. However it’s also 
not entirely clear as to whether the European Commission itself was aware of this 
shift when it gave approval to the Irish list (as it would do early in 2003). In Ireland’s 
notification to the Commission published in the EU’s Official Journal in April 2003, 
no reference is made to the Amendment Act. Instead the Commission’s approval was 
based on a list drawn up under the 1999 legislation (CEC, 2003).  
 
Yet it was the 2003 legislation that was to used to enforce the current status quo. As 
of 2004 the FAI/BSkyB deal has been renegotiated such that Ireland’s qualifying 
games at least are screened on both RTÉ (which eventually paid out €2.3m for the 
rights (Malone, 2003) and BSkyB Sports. Live rights to Ireland’s other home games 
are still the exclusive preserve of BSkyB although Irish fans can view deferred 
coverage on TV3.  
 
Yet if Christophe Forax’s July 2002 assertion that Ireland’s existing legislation was 
sufficient to permit retrospection we need to ask why this shift took place? One 
possible explanation is that it offered the Irish state a means of retrieving (some of) 
the Irish games at an acceptable political cost. That the current Irish administration 
might be reluctant to take on an organ of News International has already been pointed 
to. By contrast offending the FAI – a body already the villain of the piece in the 
public eye – was tolerable (especially given that parallel negotiations between the 
Irish government and the FAI relating to the building of a national stadium offered the 
government a certain degree of leverage in negotiating the retrospective designation 
of events. Although the BSkyB’s €7.5m offer to the FAI represented a significant 
sum, it was dwarfed by the possible state investment into a national stadium). 
 
Yet if political self-interest offers a partial explanation for the introduction of the 
2003 Amendment, the state itself would offer a more explicit statement of its thinking 
in a document submitted to the European Commission in summer 2003. Following the 
publication by the European Commission of the Fourth Review of the Television 
Without Frontiers directive (CEC, 2003a) in January 2003, the Commission invited 
written contributions from interested parties on the conclusions of the Review.  
 
The submission from the Irish State is one of the longest. The major thrust of the 
submission argues for a radical reinterpretation of Article 2 of the TWF directive 
which denies Member States the right to restrict retransmission on their territory of 
television broadcasts from other Member States. The Irish submission notes that in 
the era of cross-border broadcasting the:  
 
ability of some Member States to have meaningful regulation at a national 
level will be eroded unless the Directive is revised to provide that services 
directed primarily at a given Member State are subject to the regulation of that 
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Member State. Ireland suggests that this should be achieved by determining a 
competent jurisdiction for each individual broadcasting service, instead of 
focussing on broadcasters. (Department of Communications, Marine & 
Natural Resources (DCMNR), 2003.) 
 
In short the Irish submission argued that if a UK-registered company established a 
station explicitly targeting the Irish market then it should be regulated by the Irish 
state not a British regulator. As such the Irish submission suggests a reversal of one of 
the original directive’s most fundamental tenets – that individual states should not 
have the power to regulate broadcasting services that were considered acceptable 
under another state’s broadcasting regime.  
 
This point forms the context for the submission’s comments on Article 3a which also 
offer some clarification for the content of the 2003 legislation. (These are lengthy but 
deserve quoting in full): 
 
…a UK broadcaster only requires the consent of the Independent Television 
Commission to purchase exclusive rights to an event after an event has been 
formally designated in another Member State. Thus according to the ITC code, 
it was possible for BSkyB to enter into a contract for exclusive live rights for 
Ireland’s qualifying games in he Football World Cup and European 
Championship games without the consent of the ITC. However the subsequent 
designation of the events by Ireland did not, it would appear, require BSkyB to 
seek the approval of the ITC as the contract had already been entered into. 
There was therefore no retrospective effect. 
 
In order to ensure that these games were made available to Irish free-to-air 
broadcasters, Ireland enacted new legislative provision which imposed 
obligations on sports event organisers to make broadcasting right available to 
qualifying broadcasters subject to the payment of reasonable market rates. 
(DCMNR, 2003) 
 
The reference to the ITC is at the crux of the matter. As a UK-registered broadcaster 
BSkyB was subject to the Independent Television Commission. Clearly the Irish 
government had little faith in the ITC’s ability/willingness to pursue BSkyB. 
However this seems overly pessimistic given the existence of a prior case where the 
ITC had gone to bat on behalf of another member state.  
 
In June 2000 TVDanmark, a Danish subscription broadcaster outbid two Danish 
public broadcasters to secure exclusive rights five Danish World Cup qualifying 
matches. These were designated events under Danish legislation but the Danish 
authorities were unable to force TVDanmark to make the games available to either of 
Denmark's public service channels because TVDanmark was registered as a British 
company. As such it came within the regulatory ambit of the Independent Television 
Commission in the UK who went to House of Lords, the highest legal authority in the 
UK in an effort to force TVDanmark to offer the games on a non-exclusive basis to 
Denmark’s public service broadcasters. TVDanmark, however, argued that it had 
acquired the rights to the Danish games in accordance with the ITC's own rules, a 
point conceded by the ITC. However the ITC had also consulted with the Danish 
Ministry of Culture which noted that under the Danish system for protecting listed 
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events TVDanmark's acquisition of the rights would not have been legal. 
Consequently the ITC decided to pursue TV Danmark under the Danish code: in 
effect a regulatory authority from one European country applied the - slightly 
different - rules of another regulatory authority in its own jurisdiction, a decision 
which House of Lords implicitly endorsed. The Lords ruling stated that the intention 
of Article 3a was "perfectly clear", namely: 
 
to prevent the exercise by broadcasters of exclusive rights in such a way that a 
substantial proportion of the public in another member state was deprived of 
the possibility of following a designated event. (House of Lords, 2001) 
 
Given prior evidence that the ITC was willing to go to bat on behalf of designated 
events in other member states, why was the Irish state unwilling to pursue that route? 
 
This reluctance seems likely to have been prompted by concern over the question of 
retrospective designation. In the TVDanmark case, it appears that the ITC, whilst 
acknowledging the differences in the manner the UK and Denmark had implemented 
Article 3a, felt that that there was nothing in the Danish legislation which actually 
contravened Article 3a. However the same may not have been true of the Irish attempt 
to effect a retrospective “going forward” listing. As noted earlier Article 3a stresses 
the need to draw up such a list in a timely fashion. This is reflected in British 
Broadcasting Act 1996, section 101 of which was amended to effect Section 3a of 
TWF. Subsection 4 of section 101 noted that designations of events would "not have 
effect where the television programme providing the first service is exercising rights 
acquired before the commencement of this section." I.e. retrospective designation of 
events was not permitted. 
 
Hence the Irish government passed a piece of legislation the preamble of which states 
that it will give “further effect to article 3a” but which appears to contravene aspects 
of precisely that article, by permitting retrospection and focusing on the obligations of 
event organisers rather than broadcasters.  
 
The Final Whistle 
 
The major question raised in the Irish public sphere by the BSkyB deal focused on the  
question of how and where one draws the line between sport as cultural event and 
sport as business. The role of the national side as an expression of national identity 
creates a strong attachment to that team from the national audience. This has 
implications for public service broadcasters. As one national newspaper commentator 
recognised with regard to the BSkyB deal: “what is particularly corrosive about this 
development for RTÉ is that it undermines its whole identity as a national 
broadcaster” (Oliver, 2002). If public service broadcasting is meant to mean anything, 
it is meant to mean broadcasters reflecting and covering truly national events which 
bind the country together. The loss of such important cultural or sporting makes 
RTÉ's attempts to remain a truly national broadcaster extremely difficult.  
 
However the almost religious fervour excited by the Irish team amongst its home fans 
translates in commercial terms into content which can draw in audiences in a more or 
less guaranteed fashion. The scale of the vitriol hurled at the FAI seems in large part 
to have been motivated by the fact that the FAI’s actions reminded fans of the painful 
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fact that commerce plays a considerable role in modern sport. This may be overt 
where the team in question is a PLC – the question is whether this should be case in 
dealing with national teams.  
 
This confusion was reflected in press coverage at the time of the deal and – as noted 
earlier – in the failure to simultaneously examine the story from sporting, political and 
financial perspectives. However such failings were not simply the result of difficulties 
over journalistic demarcation. Although most of Ireland’s major daily and Sunday 
papers criticised the BSkyB deal most did so by treating BSkyB as a standalone 
company. The significance of cross-media ownership in the BSkyB deal was ignored 
by large elements of the Irish press: titles owned by the market-dominating  
Independent Newspapers Group seemed particularly reluctant to discuss the link 
between concentration of media ownership within and across media and political 
influence. Ironically then the FAI/BSkyB deal was a story that could only be 
completely understood by drawing attention to a subject – concentration of media 
ownership - that a major element of the Irish public sphere has an active interest in 
avoiding. The dominance enjoyed by Independent Newspapers did not emerge from a 
vacuum, however  – one can argue that much of the weakness of the Irish public 
sphere derives from a consistent failure on the part of Irish governments to take 
regulation of media ownership seriously.  
 
However the story also points up a weakness in another element of the Irish public 
sphere – RTÉ – one for which the state is more directly culpable. Following a major 
showdown between the state and RTE in 1972 which ended in the sudden removal of 
the RTE authority, the Irish public service broadcaster has generally been quiescent in 
its dealings with the government of the day. The situation whereby RTE’s licence fee 
was effectively frozen from 1986 to 1996 is thus understood “locally” as an attempt 
by the state to keep the broadcaster on a tight leash (Corcoran, 2004, pp. 98 - 103). 
The idea of a direct broadcaster-state confrontation along the lines of the BBC’s 
recent clash with the Blair administration over the death of weapons expert David 
Kelley, for example, is almost inconceivable in an Irish context. In this respect the 
timing of the BSkyB deal was particularly awkward for RTE, given its coincidence 
with delicate negotiations between the government and broadcaster over precisely the 
question of a licence fee increase. Such conditions were not conducive to the 
production of programmes discussing either the link between RTÉ’s financial position 
and their low offer to the FAI or broader issues such as the link between the 
government and News International. On the surface RTE’s situation with respect to 
future licence fee increase has subsequently been placed on a more secure footing: in 
the aftermath of the FAI/BSkyB deal RTÉ did in fact secure a substantial licence fee 
increase. What’s more they succeeded in convincing the government to index future 
increases to inflation. However such index-linked increases are not automatic but are 
subject to the government's assessment that RTÉ is meeting certain 
restructuring/public service requirements. In effect future increases remain in the gift 
of whatever administration happens to be in power.9 The implications for the  
objectivity of the Irish public service broadcaster in covering the state’s activities are 
worrying.   
 
                                                 
9 Actual practice bears this concern out. Although RTE was technically entitled to a 2.2% increase in 
its licence fee at the close of 2003, the government capped this at 1.5% citing concerns over RTE’s 
failure to sufficiently reduce staff numbers. See Oliver 2003. 
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Ultimately, however, the most important issue may be that thrown up by the 
discussion in the latter part of this paper, namely the extent to which TV Without 
Frontiers fails to address the issue of transnational services dedicated to a foreign 
state, a situation clearly not contemplated in the framing of the directive in 1989 or 
1997. It has subsequently emerged that the Irish 2003 submission on TWF was simply 
the first salvo in a campaign to place the regulatory challenge of transnational 
broadcasters at the centre of the broadcasting policy agenda during Ireland’s 
presidency of the EU in the first six months of 2004. Outlining his policy priorities for 
the presidency, the Irish Minister for Communications noted that: 
 
We need a level playing field in the area of broadcasting. It is simply not on 
that satellite broadcasters are not regulated in the markets into which they 
broadcast. We need to be able to apply national measures to satellite 
broadcasters. (Government Information Service (GIS), 2004a.) 
 
Specifically the Irish government has sought to table an amendment to TV Without 
Frontiers which would allow governments to regulate broadcasters who provide 
television services specifically targeted at viewers in another country. However, at an 
informal EU Ministerial Conference on Broadcasting held in Dublin on March 2-3, 
the Irish proposal met resistance from both the European Commissioner Vivianne 
Reding and indeed several other member states (GIS, 2004b). Although the Irish 
government’s press release after the meeting suggested that the question was still 
open, Vivianne Reding’s comments suggest otherwise:  
 
The ‘originating country’ was responsible for regulation and licensing. "That 
is the general rule of the common market. It is not possible to change that," 
she said. (Oliver, 2004)  
 
Given this outcome the essentially stopgap measure that was the 2003 Irish 
Broadcasting legislation looks set to remain in place creating an unusual (if not 
unique) negotiating environment for Irish sporting organisations. As both the FAI and 
Irish Rugby Football Union point out in their own submissions to the European 
Commission10 with regard to the retrospective going forward of Section II of the 
Broadcasting Bill 2003:   
 
The way Section II is constructed means that there is no certainty from the 
point of view of anybody dealing with the Association in relation to 
contractual arrangements we conclude in the future for the broadcasting of our 
matches. At any stage in the future the Minister can create a new classification 
for matches other than qualification matches that we organise which would 
then retrospectively impact on any contractual arrangements we had already 
made in respect of those matches. From a commercial point of view this 
creates an unacceptable level of certainty for any broadcasters we may be 
dealing with. (Football Association of Ireland, 2003 & Irish Rugby Football 
Union, 2003) 
 
                                                 
10 Interestingly Satellite and Cable Broadcasters’ Group (which included British Sky Broadcasting) also 
made a submission to the Commission but made no reference to article 3a or the Irish events.  
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It’s hard to imagine that the original framers of Article 3a ever envisaged such an 
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